When major investors own shares in multiple firms in the same industry, the cross ownership changes competitive interests and moves the equilibrium closer to the monopoly solution. In the presence of cross ownership, the traditional measure of industry concentration, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, fails to accurately reflect the level of competition in the market. We extend the literature on cross ownership and develop a robust measure, a modified Hirschman-Herfindahl index, that captures the competitive effects of cross ownership.
Introduction
When major investors own shares in multiple firms in the same industry, the cross ownership changes competitive interests and moves the equilibrium closer to the monopoly solution. In the presence of cross ownership, the traditional measure of industry concentration, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, fails to accurately reflect the level of competition in the market. We extend the literature on cross ownership and develop a robust measure, a modified Hirschman-Herfindahl index, that captures the competitive effects of cross ownership.
The modified Hirschman-Herfindahl index requires a measure of the degree of control exercised by the various shareholders of the firm. One candidate for this measure is the Shapley value-see Owen (1982) , Shapley (1953) , Shapley and Shubik (1954) and Leech (1988) . Some recent empirical studies of the premium paid for voting rights on shares of stock have used the Shapley value as predictor of the premium, and with some success-see Rydqvist (1987) and Zingales (1994 Zingales ( , 1995 .
We show that the Shapley value can generate paradoxical results when ownership interests in corporations can be held indirectly through layered corporate entities and when there exists cross ownership of shares at the different corporate levels. We illustrate this fact with a couple of simple examples based on patterns of corporate ownership in the cable television industry where layered corporate entities and cross ownership is common. The fact that the cross ownership itself may undermine the validity of a commonly proposed measure is important to note. We show that the paradox exposed by the case of the cable television industry is an example of a well known paradox in defining a measure of control in voting games-see Brams and Affuso (1976), Fischer and Schotter (1978) .
Cross-ownership, Competition and Measures of Concentration

Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
As a benchmark for the analysis of the effects of cross-ownership, we begin with a review of the results from the standard Cournot-Nash oligopoly model in which the firms are considered independent. There exist N firms (j=1,...,N) with homogeneous outputs x j , total industry output X ≡ ∑ j x j , and therefore market shares s j ≡ x j /X. Let p(X) be the inverse demand function for the market and define η as the price elasticity of demand. Let c j (x) be firm j's cost of output level x, so that π j ≡ p(X)x j -c j (x j ) is firm j's profit.
In a Cournot Nash equilibrium firm j maximizes its expected profit conditional on the output of the remaining firms, 
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium output for firm j satisfies the first order condition
Of course, firm j's Cournot-Nash equilibrium output is below its competitive equilibrium output in which 
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The Cournot-Nash model treats the firms as independent entities, each maximizing its own profit without regard to the effect on other firms' profits. This makes sense if each firm is owned by a distinct group of investors, or possibly if investors are a diffuse class and the management of each firm is distinct. However, if major investors own shares in a number of ostensibly competing firms, the assumption of independence may be cast into doubt.
Cross ownership of shares can substantially alter the incentives of managers and the equilibrium output of the firms. Cross ownership means that an investor's profit is a combination of the profit earned by each of the competing firms. Consequently, the marginal profit earned by an investor from a firm's increased output includes not simply the marginal profit of that firm in isolation, but also the marginal impact on the profits of the competing firm. From the standpoint of the investor, therefore, the optimal output for each individual firm is less than in the standard Cournot-Nash model-see, for example, Reynolds and Snapp (1986) . A simple, if extreme, case which illustrates the problem is a duopoly with both firms owned entirely by the same investor: from the standpoint of the investor the optimal output for each is one-half of the monopoly output.
A formal definition of equilibrium requires a statement of the firm's objective 
For the time being, we assume that it is possible to measure investor i's degree of control of firm j by a non-negative parameter γ ij , with ∑ i γ ij =1 for each firm j, such that firm j chooses x j to maximize the weighted profit of its owners:
We make no assumption here that an owner's degree of control, γ ij , is equal to his ownership stake, β ij .
The first order condition for an interior solution is
Two examples provide a useful illustration of the impact of cross ownership on the choice of outputs. 
Since investor A is the sole owner of firm 1, the output of firm 1 is set to maximize investor A's profit. The output of firm 1, however, affects investor A's aggregate profit both directly through the profit earned from firm 1 and indirectly through its impact on the profit of firm 2 in which investor A has a stake: Figure 1 shows the reaction functions for the two firms and the resulting equilibrium (for the case of linear demand and constant marginal cost), and contrasts this with the reaction functions and equilibrium for a traditional Cournot-Nash equilibrium without cross ownership. Firm #2's reaction function is unchanged by the cross-ownership. Firm #1's reaction function, however, is less aggressive, so that for any given output from firm #2, firm #1 lowers its output below the Cournot-Nash level. This must be the case since at the Cournot-Nash level the first order effects of changing output on own profits are zero, but the first order effects on the other firm's profits are negative. In equilibrium, firm #1's output is less than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, firm #2's output is slightly greater than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and total output is less than in the CournotNash equilibrium. One can also show that the price-cost margin for each firm is higher than in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Example #2: Symmetric oligopoly with symmetric cross ownership.
[Insert text for example #2]
The Hirschman-Herfindahl Index
The most commonly used measure of horizontal concentration in anti-trust analysis is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI), the sum of squared market shares, H ≡ ∑ j s j 2 .
Measuring market shares, s j , in units of percentage points, the HHI in a market with a single monopolist is 10,000. The HHI approaches 0 as the number of firms grows large, assuming every firm's shares of the market declines proportionately. The HHI provides an ordinal measure of competition in a market even when the market is not divided equally among the firms. For example, a market divided equally among 3 firms has an HHI of 1/3 and is considered less concentrated than a market with 4 firms and market shares 0.7, 0.1, 0.1 and 0.1 which gives an HHI of slightly more than 1/2. The U.S.
Federal Trade Commission makes explicit reference to the HHI in its Merger Guidelines:
As an aid to the interpretation of market data, the Agency will use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") of market concentration. …The Agency divides the spectrum of market concentration as measured by the HHI into three regions that can be broadly characterized as unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), moderately concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and highly concentrated (HHI above 1800).
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As noted by Rader (1972) , one rationalization for the reliance upon the HHI is the fact there is a direct correspondence between the HHI and the industry average price-cost margin (the Lerner index) arising in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. To see this, first rearrange the terms of equation (2) so that the left hand side is the firm's price-cost margin, L j , and the right hand side is the firm's market share divided by the elasticity of demand:
From this, calculate the industry wide Lerner index as the market share weighted average price-cost margin:
A simple substitution produces the relationship between the Lerner index and the HHI:
This relationship is now commonly presented in textbooks on industrial organizationsee for example Krouse (1990) -since it expresses an important relationship between structure, as measured by the HHI, and performance, as measured by the Lerner index.
To illustrate the use of the HHI and as a benchmark for later comparisons, Table 1 shows the revenue shares of the major cable networks in June 1995. The HHI calculated for these shares is 818, which is 'unconcentrated' according to the Merger Guidelines.
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[Insert Table 1 Here]
Cross Ownership and the Breakdown in the HHI
Cross ownership of shares among firms substantially alters the equilibrium output of the firms, and therefore undermines the validity of the HHI as a proxy for the Lerner index. Table 2 uses example #1 to show how the HHI and the Lerner index diverge, and how this divergence is a function of the size of the cross ownership interest. The first panel shows the traditional Cournot-Nash equilibrium anticipated in the case of no cross ownership. As one can see, the industry Lerner index equals the ratio of the HHI to the elasticity as stated in equation (7) above. The second panel shows the equilibrium which obtains when there is cross ownership of firm #2's shares by the investor controlling firm #1. The equilibrium conditions are described in the description of Example #1 above. In this case, the industry Lerner index is greater than the ratio of the HHI to the elasticity.
Cross ownership breaks the equality expressed in equation (7).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
The case of example #2 is even more striking. When all investors have equal stakes in every firm, and assuming the firms have identical marginal costs, the equilibrium output for the industry as a whole is the monopoly output. The output of each individual firm is simply its equal share of the monopoly output. In this case, the calculated HHI is identical to the HHI for the case of no cross ownership. However, the Lerner index is much higher since the monopoly price is above the Cournot-Nash price. In this case, the Lerner index is invariant to the number of firms, while the HHI declines just as if competition were increasing.
The Modified Hirschman-Herfindahl Index
A number of authors have addressed the problem of cross-ownership and the right measure of concentration. Reynolds and Snapp (1986) shows that the HHI no longer accurately reflects the equilibrium price-cost margin. They calculate a modified HHI which successfully reflects the equilibrium price-cost margin in a model of cross ownership. Their modification, however, is restricted to the special case in which each firm has one sole controlling shareholder. Bresnahan and Salop (1986) analyze the impact of a joint venture among competitors. They also derive a modified HHI to quantify these competitive effects and capture the impact on market performance. Their results are specific to a list of special cases, for example, 'silent financial interest' (i.e., the case analyzed by Reynolds and Snapp) and joint control with equal weights on the interests of the two parents.
A generalalized modified Hirschman-Herfindahl index (MHHI) can be derived, however, which takes into account the cross ownership and successfully ties the observed market shares with the Lerner index measure of performance. Starting from the first order condition in equation (4), and multiplying through by X/X and 1/p, we obtain are clearly competitors to the cable networks. Nevertheless, the calculation in Table 1 will be a useful benchmark for later comparisons.
Rearranging sums, we have
Multiplying both sides by s j and summing over all j yields
By separating out the terms for which k=j, the expression for the MHHI in braces in equation (10) can be written as
To carry out the calculations using actual data on market shares and ownership and control parameters, it helps to write expression (11) in matrix form. This gives
where
The MHHI for Example #1 is 0.625. Dividing the MHHI by the price elasticity of demand parameter yields 0.54, i.e., the industry Lerner index.
Ownership and control
We now turn to address the problem of determining the weight that should be given to the profit of the different shareholders in constructing the firm's objective function,
i.e., of assigning the weights γ ij used in equation (3). This is essentially a question of determining the degree of control exercised by the various owners of the firm.
One simple assumption would be that control is proportional to each investor's share of the voting power. Assuming one-share one-vote, this means that γ ij =β ij . It is widely understood, however, that control is not simply proportional to voting rights. Since most significant corporate decisions can be implemented with a simple majority vote, an investor with 51% of the shares has closer to total control.
Shapley value and the Shapley-Shubik index
The Shapley-Shubik index is a widely used measure of a player's power in a voting game. Given the rules of voting and the distribution of votes among the players, the 
where ν(T)=1 if T∈ω, and ν(T)=0 if T∉ω, and where z is the number of investors in the firm. Restricting the value function to the range of 0 and 1 reflects the fact that this is a voting game which is either won or lost. In the more general class of games, the value function can take on any value and the expression ν
(T) -ν(T-{i}) measures player i's
marginal contribution to the particular coalition. When this is allowed, equation (14) yields the more general Shapley value. In the financial literature the label "Shapley value" is often used, even where the simpler Shapley-Shubik index is calculated. In accordance with this convention, we will sometimes use the term Shapley value even when the Shapley-Shubik index is calculated. If we need to refer specifically to the Shapley value as distinguished from the index, we will do so explicitly. Consider a corporation with four stockholders, having respectively 10, 20, 30, and 40 shares of stock. It is assumed that any decision can be settled by approval of stockholders holding a simple majority of the shares. This can be treated as a simple four-person game, in which the winning coalitions are {2,4}, {3,4}, {1,2,3}, {1,2,4}, {1,3,4} {2,3,4}, and {1,2,3,4}. We would like to find the Shapley value of this game.
To find φ, we note that the only winning coalition T such that T-{1} is not winning, is {1,2,3}. Hence, as t=3, φ 1 =(2!1!)/4!=1/12. Similarly, we find that {2,4}, {1,2,3}, and {2,3,4} are winning coalitions which are not winning if 2 is removed. Hence, φ 2 =1/12+1/12+1/12=1/4. In the same way, we find that φ 3 =1/4, while φ 4 =5/12. Thus the Shapley value is the vector (1/12,1/4,1/4,5/12). This contrasts with the 'vote vector' which would be (1/10,1/5,3/10,2/5). Note that the value is the same for players 2 and 3, even though player 3 has many more shares. This is not surprising, since player 3 has no greater opportunity than 2 to form a winning coalition; the game (thought of as a characteristic function) treats these two players symmetrically.
In a similar way, it is clear that player 4's strength is greater than his share of the stock, while player 1's strength is less. (Owen, 1982, pp. 197-198) While the Shapley-Shubik index is easy to calculate in cases where the number of shareholders is small, calculating the index when there are many shareholders is impractical since the formula relies on the number of possible permutations of shareholders. However, a reasonable approximation can be had if we treat the majority of shareholders as very small-non-atomic-and use the combinatorics for the remaining and smaller set of large shareholders-see Milnor and Shapley (1978) . The appendix to Milnor and Shapley (1978) provides a useful illustration of the calculation of Shapley values as ownership shares change.
The Shapley value has only recently been used in an analysis of shareholder control of corporations. Rydvist (1988) uses the Shapley value to test hypotheses about the value of votes among Swedish companies with dual class shares. Zingales (1994) similarly uses the Shapley value in measuring the benefits of control for Italian companies with multiple class shares. Robinson, Rumsey and White (1995) use the Shapley value in a similar analysis for Canadian firms. Other research exploiting the Shapley value include Eckbo and Verma (1994) in which the firm dividend policy is related to the firm's ownership structure, Zwiebel (1995) in his analysis block investments and the benefits of partial control, and Baker and Gompers (1999) in an analysis of executive compensation.
Previously and Leech (1988) used the Shapley value to calculate ownership concentration and control in US and British corporations, and Leech and Leahy (1991) used the Shapley value in an analysis of the effects of the concentration of control on various measures of firm performance among British companies.
The Shapley value for owners of a corporation is typically calculated on the basis of the simplified assumption that a majority of the common stock yields control of the company. It is relatively straightforward to generalize this to cases in which there are distinct classes of stock with different voting rights, since this is identical to the many cases of differential voting rights analyzed extensively in other contexts. However, there are, in fact, a host of more complicated constraints that can be placed on the operation of the firm which are not easily folded into the calculation of the Shapley value. For example, certain corporate decisions may require supramajorities. While a Shapley value can be easily calculated for the game with a simple majority and for the game with a supramajority, the real question is how to calculate the value of a single game where some decisions can be made on the basis of the simple majority and others can be made on the basis of the supramajority. And a host of legal rules protect the financial interests of minority shareholders even when the distribution of votes and the rules for voting would otherwise yield a Shapley value of zero for the minority shareholders. How to blend the power effected by these constraints together with the power calculated as a result of an analysis of the voting rights is a complicated problem. Holderness and Sheehan (1991) analyze the purchase of a stake in Turner Broadcasting Systems by a consortium of cable company investors. The agreement contains detailed rules regarding the rights of different classes of stock, the appointment of directors, establishment of specific board committees, supramajority rules for specific classes of decisions and other terms affecting the operation of the company. It would be very difficult to develop a general measure of control capable of capturing the complete range of possible terms of such agreements.
The Shapley value and the MHHI in the cable industry
The cable industry is an ideal case study for the use of the Shapley value. As Table 3 below shows, there is extensive cross ownership of interests.
3 To illustrate the use of Shapley values and the MHHI, we have calculated the Shapley values for this ownership structure and the results are displayed in Table 4 . The MHHI for the cable network industry using these Shapley values is 2,142. This is significantly higher than the HHI of 818 reported in Table 1 , removing the industry from the 'unconcentrated' category and moving it into the 'highly concentrated' category.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 Here]
The Paradox
In the material above, we developed a robust index of concentration for an industry with cross ownership of shares, the MHHI. This index requires a measure of the control exercised by the various shareholders over each corporation, and the Shapley value is a natural candidate for this measure. If, as we assumed earlier, the problem is simply one of The tiered structure of ownership interests certainly does affect the Shapley value calculations. Since the late nineteenth century there has been a widespread recognition that the tiered structuring of corporate interests can be an essential device tool for affecting the control of corporations and maximizing the power of a given stake. The importance of a tiered structure to the calculation of Shapley values can be illustrated with the simple case in which one investor owns a 51% stake in an intermediate corporation which in turn owns a 51% stake in the operating company. Although the investor indirectly holds only a 26% stake in the operating company, it has achieved certain control and a Shapley value of 100% through the use of the tiered structure regardless of the structure of ownership of the remaining 74% stake.
To evaluate the impact of a merger of indirect investors in the cable network industry it is necessary to give explicit attention to the tiered ownership structure and incorporate this into the calculations of the Shapley value and thereby into the calculations of the MHHI. So long as the information about the tiered ownership structures is at hand, incorporating this information into the Shapley value and the MHHI calculations is straightforward. But the results are in some cases problematic as we shall now see. Figure 2A shows the ownership structure for a cable network company before a merger among two of the corporate investors. Pre-merger there are three investors.
Investor #1 owns a 50% interest in the network. The remaining 50% interest is held by an intermediate corporation which is in turn owned in equal parts by investors #2 and #3.
Because of the use of this intermediate corporation, we call this a tiered ownership structure. Figure 2B shows the ownership structure after the proposed merger. Investor #2
has purchased the interests of investor #3 so that now the cable network is owned in equal parts by investors #1 and #2.
[Insert Figures This result is counterintuitive. To draw this out it is instructive to contrast the case shown in Figures 2A and 2B with a comparable case shown in Figures 3A and 3B . Figure   3A shows a cable network company in which investor #1 owns a 50% stake and in which investors #2 and #3 each own a 25% interest, but this time without the use of an intermediate corporation. Figure 3B shows the ownership structure after the proposed merger of the interests of investors #2 and #3, so that now the cable network is owned in equal parts by investors #1 and #2.
[Insert Figures 3A and 3B Here] Figure 3A shows the Shapley values for each of the three investors pre-merger. In this case a winning coalition requires investor #1 and either of investors #2 or #3. 5 In an example with three initial investors and a merger resulting in two final investors, the counterintuitive result can only arise if the investors have exactly the shares shown. If investor #1 begins with more (or less) than 50% of the shares, then the merger of interests of investors #2 and #3 cannot decrease its power which stays fixed at 1 (or 0). However, as the number of shareholders grows, the range of shareholdings over which this result obtains grows. Consider for example a case with five investors. Investors #1 and #2 each hold a 30% stake directly in the network. [Insert Table 5 Here] A similar paradox has been identified in other contexts. Brams and Affuso (1976) showed that when Britain, Ireland and Denmark were added to the EEC, the voting power of Luxembourg increased even though its percentage vote declined. Fischer and Schotter (1978) show that this possibility arises generally in voting games and not just for the 
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The two solid lines are the reaction functions, r1 and r2, of each firm in the traditional Cournot-Nash dupoly. Cournot-Nash equilibrium outputs are at point X. Cross ownership of shares in firm #2 by the owner of firm #1, β=40%, shifts the reaction function of firm #1, r1(q2), invward. This moves the equilibrium from point X to point Y. 
X Y
